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As a new principle in the world, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an obligation on the part of the international community and on the part of the states to protect civilians from mass atrocities by doing several actions like giving international aids, reducing poverty, supporting peacebuilding, educating the population, until military intervention. However, military intervention under R2P norm in Libya produce a counterproductive result which then led the country into civil war. From this background, therefore, the purpose of this article is to examine the implementation of R2P in Libya into four types of lessons learned. The first lesson, R2P is corrupted by great powers that make the military intervention far from its mandate. The second lesson is the inconsistency practice from an R2P military intervention which led to the question of credibility of military intervention in Libya. The third lesson is diplomacy must be prioritized rather than military intervention since that there is an R2P success story without military intervention. The last is the recommendation to implement Responsibility while Protecting (RWP) principle in the R2P framework.Keywords: Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Libya, Diplomacy, Military Intervention, Responsibility while Protecting

AbstractThis article is part of a forum on the report of the United Nations Secretary-General, 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', which was released on 12 January 2009. The report was written as a response to 'one of the cardinal challenges of our time, as posed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome: operationalizing the responsibility to protect'. The forum seeks to provide a range of perspectives on the report. It features contributions from Jennifer Welsh, Hugo Slim, David Chandler and Monica Serrano, and it concludes with a response from Special Advisor to the Secretary-General Edward Luck.

Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die im Bericht der unabhängigen International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty im Dezember 2001 definierten Verantwortung der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft, die Bevölkerung eines Staates vor schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu schützen - der sog. Responsibility to Protect - und überprüft die vom Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen definierten Kriterien eines Eingreifens anhand des gegenwärtigen NATO-Einsatzes in Libyen.

Written in conjunction with the launching of a new international organization, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, this report addresses some of the most challenging questions concerning how to move the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) from principle to practice. The creation of the Global Centre for R2P marks a historic watershed as, to date, promotion of the norm has fallen on the shoulders of professionals within NGOs, governments, and international institutions who have other primary responsibilities. This report is primarily intended as a resource for the Global Centre, as well as for the myriad institutions and individuals with whom the Centre will work as it moves R2P forward.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was created in the hope of overcoming the barrier that state sovereignty, as a principle, had become to actions of humanitarian intervention. It was imagined that as mass atrocity crimes were coming to the attention of the international community, that, on the whole, they were willing, able and eager to intervene in order to stop the violence in question. Holding them back was sovereignty as both a legal and normative barrier. This was always a bad explanation for the pervasive lack of humanitarian intervention; accordingly R2P, as a bad solution, has failed almost entirely. The problem is, and always has been, that when faced with mass atrocity crimes, the international community is plagued by a near-permanent lack of political will to action.

AbstractDuring the first decade of the twenty-first century, a campaign developed and succeeded in establishing a new doctrine in international affairs called the 'Responsibility to Protect' which had a prevention and a rehabilitation dimension but was mostly focused on the rights and responsibilities of states to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states when the latter failed to protect their citizens from mass atrocities. Movements grew up around the doctrine to publicise it, analyse it, and ensure its implementation. An example of the latter is W2I, the 'Will to Intervene' which, unlike R2P, did not require UN authorisation for intervention as part of its platform. A key test of the doctrine was Darfur. Yet the study of the case indicates no likelihood of intervention even under the Obama regime that was committed to doing something about Darfur and has put multilateralism at the forefront of its foreign policy. The report concludes by contrasting the huge discrepancy between the rhetorical success in the adoption of R2P as an international norm and the absence of practices consistent with that sweeping victory. The paper suggests that advances in international norms are best indicated, not by the endorsement of general principles, but by the development of actual practices on the ground.

India has been alleged for adopting a reluctant approach to the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P). In light of this allegation, this article explains India's approach to R2P and attempts to answer why India has adopted a cautious and reluctant approach. To give a comprehensive picture and provide a compelling account of India's cautiousness and reluctance, this article uses an eclectic approach. The systemic and domestic variables, along with normative and materialistic factors, have been taken simultaneously into account. It points out that India's approach to R2P is shaped by a set of six variables—historical legacies, especially India's colonial experience and its applications for its attitude towards the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty; domestic compulsions such as failure of India to deliver inclusive and equitable development and ensuring human rights and citizen's dignity in remote areas; the intentions of the great powers; security concerns like insurgency in various parts, including Kashmir; its approach to the doctrine per se; and unintended consequences of conflict escalation and its implication for India—have been a linchpin in shaping India's approach. It demonstrates how these factors have cumulatively shaped India to neither vote in favor of intervention nor stand up with the governments that fail to protect their citizens, and thus fall in fulfilling their obligations under the first principle of the doctrine of R2P.

Where does the humanitarian community sit in relation to continuing debates about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)? The third pillar of R2P is often seen as the practical manifestation of an older idea of humanitarian intervention, given much attention after the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica. Many humanitarians have long been reticent about the idea of so-called humanitarian intervention and, thus, of R2P. This article examines the logic behind this reticence and explores the practical relationship between R2P and humanitarian action. In particular, it focuses on three major crises during Holmes's time as Emergency Relief Coordination – Darfur, Sri Lanka and Myanmar – and goes on to consider briefly how and why R2P has been invoked, or not, in the more recent crises of Libya and Syria. It concludes with reflections about the implications for the future.